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Abstract:  
 
Legitimate as well as illegitimate organizations and entities are gaining access to information 
about social media (SM) users through illegal, extralegal, and quasi-legal means. Worse still, 
many organizations and individuals using SM have become targets and victims of cybercrimes. 
SM have also led to an exposure of unethical and illegal conducts within some organizations. 
One estimate suggested that 36% of social networking users have reported experiencing malware 
attacks through their profiles. Another study suggested that one in four companies have become 
cybercrime victims via social networking sites. Likewise, about a quarter of employers surveyed 
by the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics in 2009 had disciplined an employee for 
improper activities on social networking sites. Organizations that fail to take appropriate 
technological and behavioral measures related to SM are likely to suffer reputation damages, loss 
of customers' confidence, and other types of economic losses. The goal of this paper is to 
develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit mechanism for understanding privacy and 
security issues associated with SM. To achieve this goal, we draw upon literatures on diverse 
areas such as institutional theory, marketing and criminology. Specifically, we examine how 
various institutions from the standpoint of SM superimpose in a unique interaction with SM 
related technologies’ natures that influence businesses’ and consumers’ privacy and security. We 
discuss how various features of SM related technologies such as newness (leading to 
ineffectiveness of existing IT security products), complexity (difficulty to understand SM’s 
functioning) and attractiveness of SM as a cybercrime target (availability of information with 
superior targetability and huge size and rapid growth of SM). We also examine how regulative 
institutions (lack of laws to deal with SM as well as lack of enforcement of existing laws), 
normative institutions (lack of ethical and professional guidelines) and cognitive institutions 
(lack of precautionary measures and lack of defensive measures or counterpoison) have 
contributed to a lack of behavioral and attitudinal measures to ensure privacy and security. 
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Article: 
 
Introduction  
 
The rapid growth of social media (SM) has posed fundamental security and privacy challenges. 
SM have attracted various actors that engage in illegal, extra-legal, and sometimes criminal 
activities. As evidenced by the recent attacks on Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace, cyber-
criminals are exploiting the viral nature of Web 2.0 and social networking sites (Kshetri, 2010a). 
In April 2010, the U.K.’s Nottinghamshire Police reported that crimes associated with Facebook 
that were reported to the agency (e.g., sex crimes, verbal abuse, assault) increased by 346% 
during the previous 22 months (Peppiatt, 2010). According to Kaspersky Lab, in the first quarter 
of 2010, Facebook was the No. 4 most targeted site by phishers, after PayPal, eBay and HSBC 
(Richmond, 2010).  
 
Preliminary studies indicate a high rate of returns associated with organizations’ implementation 
of SM for marketing activities. A study conducted by vitrue (http://vitrue.com/) indicated that in 
the average the value of a 'Fan' on SM is $3.60 (Morrissey, 2010). Yet privacy and security 
concerns have hindered organizations’ adoption of SM. For instance, companies are increasingly 
limiting their employees’ access to social networking sites. Yet, about a quarter of employers 
surveyed by the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics in 2009 had disciplined at least one 
employee for improper activities on social networking sites (Chen, 2010). A survey 
commissioned by Robert Half Technology found that 21 % of chief information officers have 
limited the personal use of SM sites in the workplace. Note that a previous survey commissioned 
by Robert Half Technology found that 58 % of companies have banned SM sites altogether 
(Magder, 2010). A study by Sophos indicates that 12-17% of organizations surveyed control 
access to social networking sites due to concerns related to malware and data leakage (Lardinois, 
2009).  
 
Experts argue that in order to prevent cybercrimes, it is important for users and platform owners 
to consider the ethical, legal, and technical issues associated with SM (Chretien, Ryan, Chretien 
and Kind, 2009; Lagu, Kaufman, Asch, and Armstrong, 2010; Ramsey and Venkatesan, 2010; 
Thompson, Dawson and Ferdig, 2008). The productive use of SM in marketing activities, 
tempered with an appropriate level of privacy and security, is a strategic policy action item, and, 
a theoretical issue that adjoins broad-based substantive interests within marketing to various 
social science disciplines. Although prior researchers have acknowledged the role of SM, they 
have paid relatively less attention to how privacy and security issues are affecting the diffusion 
patterns of SM. Thus, it is important for managers to better understand privacy and security 
issues associated with SM.  
 
The purpose of our study is to contribute to filling this void. We examine how institutional and 
technological environments are linked to behavioral and attitudinal measures to ensure privacy 
and security in SM. We develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit mechanism for 
understanding privacy and security issues associated with SM. To achieve this goal, we draw 
upon literatures on diverse areas such as institutional theory, marketing, and criminology.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. We proceed by first providing a brief survey of privacy and 
security concerns associated with SM. Next, we examine the institutional and technological 
environments and relevant issues facing SM. Then, we discuss privacy and security issues within 
the context of the specific environments and provide some practical implications. The final 
section provides concluding comments.  
 
Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with SM: A Survey  
 
The rise in privacy and security breaches in SM can be treated as part of a larger trend of the 
rapid growth in the global cybercrime industry (Kshetri, 2010a). Due to the government’s 
constant public announcements of internet security breaches and pending cyberterrorism, there is 
a heightened sense of fear and anxiety about cybercrimes involving SM among individuals and 
businesses. In this section, we organize the discussion by focusing separately on privacy and 
security issues facing businesses and consumers and also on various forms of cybercrimes 
associated with SM, which can be considered as a conceptual superset of privacy and security 
issues.  
 
Impacts on businesses  
 
A survey conducted by IBM found that U.S. businesses worry more about cybercrimes than 
about physical crimes (Christian Science Monitor, 2006). One estimate suggested that one in 
four companies report attacks via social networking sites (Kaplan, 2009). Advertisers have been 
complaining about click fraud of up to 100% (Techcrunch.com, 2009). Note that a large 
proportion of Facebook revenue comes from pay-per-click (PPC) advertising from small self-
serve advertisers. It is reported that some advertisers spend $30,000 a day on ads on Facebook 
(Arrington, 2009). SM are also associated with threats such as phishing and the leakage of 
intellectual property (Kavur, 2010). According to a study by Open DNS (www.opendns.com) 
Facebook was the second biggest phishing target after PayPal and was the most blocked website 
by companies (Cooter, 2011).  
 
Impacts on consumers  
 
An IBM survey released in 2006 found that there were three times more Americans, who thought 
they would be more likely victims of a computer crime “in the next year” than of a physical 
crime (Keizer, 2006). According to Consumer Reports’ State of the Net survey released in May 
2010, 9% of social network users experienced some forms of abuse within the past year (e.g., 
malware infections, scams, identity theft or harassment) (Woollacott, 2010). In June 2009, 
laptops of several business school students at Yale University were simultaneously infected, 
which was suspected to have spread through Facebook (Finkle, 2009). Cyber-criminals have also 
targeted Twitter users by using links with malware that tag current topics (Voigt, 2009).  
 
Cyber-criminals’ actions are centered around popular SM activities. One of them, for instance, is 
online games. A Cisco study released in July 2010 indicated that 7% of Facebook users across 
the world access the site to play the interactive game, Farmville, which its users spend an 
average of 68 minutes a day on virtual farming. Likewise, another game, Mafia Wars, is played 
by 5% of Facebook users daily. Each user that played Mafia Wars spent 52 minutes on the game 
while at work. Cisco believes that cyber-criminals are developing ways to deliver malware via 
these games (The Straits Times, 2010).  
 
Types and classification of cybercrimes associated with SM  
 
Glaser (1971) identified and classified various types of crimes, including: predatory crimes 
against property, predatory crimes against person, illegal service crimes, and public disorder 
crimes. Most of these can be extended in the context of the cyberspace, more specifically into 
SM. Cyber attacks can be classified using various criteria. One way to classify them is to 
consider whether they are directed against an intended target (e.g., targeted and opportunistic 
attacks) or are just broad-stroke targeting. Cyber attacks can also be classified into two 
categories based on whether they are predatory or market-based. A further way to classify 
cybercrimes is related to the relative roles of human and technology elements-- Type I and Type 
II cybercrimes.  
 
Targeted vs. opportunistic attacks  
 
In targeted attacks, specific tools are used against specific SM targets. Targeted attacks are 
carried out by skilled hackers with expertise to do serious damages. Some of them are motivated 
by financial gains. Targeted attacks are also initiated by terrorists, rival companies (e.g., click 
frauds in Facebook), ideological hackers and/or government agencies. Hackers that were initially 
involved in mass attacks are moving towards more sophisticated focused attacks that target SM 
sites.  
 
Opportunistic attacks, on the other hand, entail releasing worms and viruses that spread 
indiscriminately across the Internet. Opportunistic attacks are less dangerous than targeted 
attacks and have smaller financial ramifications.  
 
Predatory cybercrimes vs. market-based cybercrimes  
 
Cybercrimes can also be grouped into two types: predatory cybercrimes for profit and market-
based cybercrimes (Naylor, 2005). Predatory cybercrimes can be defined as illegal acts in the 
cyberspace in which "someone definitely and intentionally takes or damages the person or 
property of another" (Glaser, 1971). An example could be stealing money from someone’s bank 
account using the information fraudulently received from SM users. From the national GNP 
point of view, these acts do not produce new goods or services. They simply redistribute the 
existing wealth. Market-based cybercrimes, on the other hand, generate new incomes rather than 
redistributing the existing wealth (Naylor, 2005). Such crimes occur, for example, in the sales of 
stolen credit card information and illegal drugs online.  
 
Type I and Type II cybercrimes involving SM  
 
Gordon and Ford (2006) have divided cybercrime into distinct categories. In their categorization, 
Type I cybercrime mostly contains technological elements, such as malware attacks via social-
networking sites, which are growing in volume recently (Whitney, 2010). A study estimated that 
36% of social networking users reported experiencing malware attacks through their profiles 
(Tuazon and Mark, 2010). It should be noted that login details from social networking websites 
can also be bought in the underground economy. The Sydney Morning Herald (2010) reported 
that a Russian hacker known as “Kirllos,” who was living in New Zealand, was offering the 
login details (i.e. usernames and passwords) of 1.5 million Facebook users. The price was 
NZ$62.70 (about US$ 44) per 1000 accounts sold on an underground hacker forum.  
 
Type II cybercrimes have mainly human elements (Gordon and Ford, 2006). Turning now to the 
specific context of cybercrimes targeting SM sites, it is important to note that crimes such as 
"Facebook phishing" are rising. It is possible that a cyber-criminal may claim to be a friend and 
convince a Facebook user to share his/her password. This is a very serious security breach since 
over 50% Facebook users were found to employ the same password for their individual bank 
accounts (Rodgers, 2009).  
 
Institutional and Technological Environment Facing SM  
 
As a visual aid, Figure 1 schematically represents how privacy and security issues in SM, and 
more broadly cybercrimes, are tightly linked to the institutional and technological environment. 
We discuss building blocks of the model in this section. An understanding of model would help 
organizations take technological, behavioral and perceptual/attitudinal measures to combat the 
threat of cybercrime. Organizations that fail to take appropriate technological and behavioral 
measures related to SM are likely to suffer reputation damages, loss of customers' confidence, 
and other types of economic losses (Figure 1).  
 
Technological Environment  
 
A firm’s strategy is tightly linked to the technological environment within which it is operating 
(Audretsch, 1991). In this paper’s context, we discuss three main characteristics of technologies 
enabling SM: newness, complexity, and superior targetability. Let’s take a look at each of the 
components in turn.  
 
Newness  
 
The number of malware products targeting social networking sites is increasing rapidly. One 
estimate suggested that the number of malware products spreading via social networking sites 
increased from about 10,000 in 2007 to over 25,000 during 2008 (Tanase, 2010). Cyber-
criminals are attracted by SM sites’ economies of scale and effectiveness. Due to the newness of 
SM, however, most existing IT security products are ineffective. Many SM sites are found to 
contain vulnerabilities that are undetectable and untraceable to most available security 
technologies. 
 
For instance, IT security products (such as, Web filtering, firewalls and network security 
devices) are inadequate to deal with malware targeting SM sites (Kavur, 2010). In sum, 
conventional security software is of little help to deal with vulnerabilities involving SM (Null, 
2001).  
 
Figure 1 - A framework for understanding security and privacy issues facing SM 
 
 
Complexity  
 
Another problem concerns the difficulty in understanding SM’s functioning. Experts have, for 
instance, complained that SM users are not given simple ways to understand “what personal 
information is being made available to whom” (Marks, 2010). Cowan (2010) has summarized 
complexity in Facebook’s privacy measures best: “Rapid growth, a pile-up of new features and 
ad hoc responses to previous privacy concerns meant the site's privacy controls had become 
maddeningly complex, with users required to navigate 50 different settings and 170 different 
options”. 
 
We can further illustrate SM’s complexity with an example of Facebook ads. Before we proceed, 
it is important to note that Facebook served 176.3 billion ads in the first quarter of 2010, which is 
more than by Yahoo (Cowan, 2010). Note that ads work differently in Facebook compared to 
search engines such as Google and yahoo. While an ad can be seen on the parked domain page, 
or when an Internet users types in a keyword, it may not be possible to see a Facebook ad. This is 
because Facebook ads are “hyper targeted” based on “deep demographic data” (Tanase, 2010). 
For instance, using the self-serve ads, an advertiser can target “users that are female, aged 13-17, 
and, who live in San Francisco” (Cutler and Marshal, 2009). A user that does not fit this profile 
does not see the ad.  
 
Facebook advertisers have claimed that their ads are clicked by competitors, leading to higher 
costs (Arrington, 2009). A high level of complexity may make it difficult for an advertiser to 
track fraudulent activities associated with an ad.  
 
The rise of cybercrimes targeting social network users is also associated with and facilitated by 
the proliferation of third party applications on various SM platforms (Ramsey and Venkatesan, 
2010). For one thing, they have increased complexity. Many such applications allow users to 
store, organize and exchange information. In April 2010, Facebook started giving third-party 
applications more access to user data (Fletcher and Ford, 2010). Some Apps, which used to be 
allowed to keep user data only for 24 hours, can store them indefinitely unless users uninstall 
them. Facebook Instant Personalization launched in spring 2010 lets businesses create 
recommendation based on user data (Fletcher and Ford, 2010).  
 
Most impressive, as of July 2010, the independent developer, Zynga was estimated to have 235 
million active Facebook users a month playing games developed by the company 
(foreign.peacefmonline.com, 2010). A common complaint about many applications developed 
by independent programmers, however, is that there has been a lack of basic security measures 
and procedures in these apps (Soghoian, 2008). Worse still, some are designed to steal personal 
information. A case in point is the Facebook application, “Dislike” button recently created by a 
third-party developer. This was reported to be a malware, which created revenue for its 
developer when users completed a survey. It also gave the developer access to personal data and 
used Facebook accounts for generating spam messages (Pert, 2010). In August 2010, Facebook 
Security (http://www.faceboo k.com/security) issued a warning about the bogus Dislike button 
scam.  
 
Targetability  
 
In the context of this paper, targetability is related to a legitimate or illegitimate organization’s 
capability to reach an attractive target.  
 
Attractiveness of SM as a cybercrime target  
 
Two explanations related to attractiveness of SM can be suggested for the rapid growth of 
cybercrimes targeting SM. A simple, straightforward explanation is that cyber-criminals consider 
SM sites as a lucrative target due to their rapid growth. One estimate suggested that, as of July 
2010, 74% of the world’s Internet population visited social networking sites, and in the average, 
Internet users spent an average of six hours per month on such sites (nielsen.com, 2010). The 
number of people using Facebook reached 500 million on 21 July 2010 (Pepitone, 2010). 
Particularly, South Korea’s leading social media site, Naver, was reported to attract 95% of the 
country’s Internet population every month (nielsen.com, 2010). Likewise, eight out of the top 20 
websites in the UAE incorporate SM elements (McArthur, 2010).  
 
A second factor related to attractiveness (and often associated with privacy violation and security 
breaches on SM sites) is data quality. Data and information that is available on such sites are of 
superior quality. Unsurprisingly, legitimate enterprises, as well, as criminal outfits find it too 
tempting to self-regulate, and often actively seek to covertly gain access to the best quality 
information available in SM networks. It is important to note that target attractiveness depends 
on offenders’ perceptions of victims (Kshetri, 2010a). A lawsuit filed in August 2009 five 
individuals in the Orange County Superior Court claimed that Facebook’s business model is 
“designed to harvest as much personal and private information as possible in easiest, quickest, 
and most innocuous-looking manner possible”, which is shared with “third parties for 
commercial purposes and economic benefit” (softpedia.com, 2009).  
 
Prior research indicates that crime opportunity is a function of target attractiveness, which is 
measured in monetary or symbolic value and portability (Clarke, 1995). In this regard, 
availability of information with superior targetability, as well as, huge size and rapid growth 
make SM as an attractive target for cyber-criminals. In summary, SM’s popularity, as well, as 
the amount and quality of information stored on SM platforms make them an attractive 
cybercrime target (Ramsey and Venkatesan, 2010).  
 
Institutional Environment  
 
Institutions are defined as “macro-level rules of the game” (North, 1990, p. 27), which consist of 
"formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, 
conventions, and self-imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement characteristics" (North, 
1996). Institutional theory is described as “a theory of legitimacy seeking” (Dickson, BeShers 
and Gupta, 2004). To gain legitimacy, organizations adopt behaviors irrespective of the effect on 
organizational efficiency (Campbell, 2004). For instance, it was reported that in China, Microsoft 
blocks bloggers from posting politically objectionable words and, when Google was operating in 
the country, it shut down when users looked for sensitive words.  
 
Institutional influence on the SM industry becomes an admittedly complex process (Dickson, 
BeShers and Gupta, 2004) when organizations have to derive legitimacy from multiple sources 
such as employees, clients, local communities, professional and trade associations and 
governments. Scott (2001) proposed three institutional pillars: (i) regulative; (ii) normative and 
(iii) cognitive. These pillars relate to “legally sanctioned”, “morally governed” and 
“recognizable, taken-for-granted” behaviors respectively (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna, 
2000).  
 
An important point to note is that institutional actors’ responses lag behind the technological 
changes (Brenner, 2004; Katyal, 2001; Kshetri, 2010a). This can be attributed to institutional 
inertia. Moreover, institutional actors vary in their timing of responses to a given change in 
technology.  
 
Regulative Institutions  
 
Lack of laws to deal with SM  
 
The SM industry legal system is evolving more slowly compared to the SM technology 
development. As of August 2010, only three countries in the world-- the UK, New Zealand and 
Australia-- had developed legal framework on the use of SM for litigation purposes (Kowalski, 
2010). In August 2010, Singapore’s Supreme Court has released a Consultation Paper on the use 
of SM for litigation purposes including service of documents (Supreme Court of Singapore 
2010). Singapore is expected to be the fourth country to have a comprehensive legal framework 
on SM.  
 
Until 2009, the U.S. did not have a law which held marketers liable for false statements 
published on blogs and social networking websites. In 2009, the FTC revised its Guides 
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising. The revision defined 
instances in which a blogger’s relationship with a company is necessary to disclose to avoid 
misleading consumers (Sullivan, 2009). This was the FTC’s first revision in its guidelines for 
endorsements and testimonials since 1980 (Kee, 2009). 
 
Moreover, some economies’ existing laws have been ineffective to deal with fraudulent activities 
associated with SM. For instance, consider differences between the approaches of China and the 
U.S in dealing with astroturfing in SM. Note that astroturfing is political, advertising, or public 
relations campaigns that are formally planned by an organization, but are designed to mask the 
nature of the originator in an attempt to create the illusion of being spontaneous, popular, and 
"grassroots" behavior. SM have opened a new avenue for astroturfers. It was reported that, in 
New York State, a cosmetic surgery company had its employees pretend to be satisfied 
customers in writing online testimonials. In 2009, the New York attorney general received a 
$300,000 settlement from the company for this action (Lazar, 2010). 
 
 Similarly, a Business Week article (June 23, 2008) reported that China’s public relations firms 
such as Daqi.com, Chinese Web Union and CIC charge US$500-25,000 monthly to monitor 
online posts. They help minimize the impact of negative information and create positive brand 
value for the company. There are reports that these PR firms hire students to write good posts 
about certain brands and to criticize the competition. While critics are concerned about the 
manipulation of consumer reviews and paid reviews, Astroturfers in China haven’t faced legal 
problems.  
 
One way to understand the China-U.S. difference is to consider their experiences with modern 
capitalism. Many successful firms in mature market economies are guided by customer 
orientation and demonstrate their commitment to customer focus. Customers in these economies 
exhibit a low tolerance for acceptance of poor behavior if businesses and suppliers do not fulfill 
their implicit and explicit commitments. Due to China's short history of modern capitalism, 
Chinese clients, and customers are more likely to tolerate an absence of business ethics and a low 
level of product and service quality and/or reliability.  
 
Improper enforcement of laws  
 
Brenner (2004) notes: “. . . the traditional model of law enforcement is a compilation of past 
practices that have been deemed effective in dealing with the phenomena it confronts. The 
model’s general strategy, the reactive approach, is one that has been in use since antiquity”. Such 
an approach has been highly ineffective in the SM industry since SM crosses all borders.  
 
In addition to incomplete regulation, criticisms of improper enforcement are also significant. 
There have been concerns about possible overreach by law enforcement agencies. In the U.S., for 
instance, thanks to the 2001 Patriot Act, the federal government can ask service providers to 
submit personal details of an Internet user’s online activities without telling the Internet user 
about it. The FBI's internal audits indicated the possibility of “overreaching” by the agency in 
accessing Internet users’ information (Zittrain, 2009). Unlike the U.S., the Chinese government 
has no limit on covert monitoring of its citizenry. The Chinese version of Skype instant 
messaging software is used to monitor texting conversations and will actively block undesirable 
words and phrases (Zittrain, 2009).  
 
The FBI is reported to be in dilemma regarding the use of fake identities to investigate 
cybercrimes on SM. According to a FBI document reported by Hoover (2010), despite the 
potential of undercover operations in gaining access to private information, the agency has 
expressed concerns that undercover use of personal information may be complicated. If the 
agents do not use their own name, such information gathering can be considered unauthorized 
and/or illegal. The agency cited complications over Lori Drew’s trial, who was acquitted of 
cyber-bullying a teen who later committed suicide.  
 
The e-commerce industry is undergoing a major technological upheaval. In such situations, for 
various actors, the institutional context may not provide organizing templates, models for action, 
and sources of legitimacy (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). In most cases, such changes create 
confusion and uncertainty and produce an environment that lacks norms, templates, and models 
about appropriate strategies and structures (Newman, 2000). A lack of regulatory templates is 
reflected in substantively inconsistent responses of major SM companies to law enforcement 
requests. Hoover (2010) summarizes the FBI’s experiences in dealing with the top three social 
networking sites: 
 
…….Facebook is "often cooperative" with law enforcement emergency requests for 
information, while MySpace requires law enforcement to provide a search warrant to see 
private messages less than 181 days old. Twitter, meanwhile, is apparently even less 
helpful than MySpace, as the presentation notes it has no contact number for law 
enforcement to call, only retains the last log-in IP address, has no guide for law 
enforcement, and will not produce data without a warrant or subpoena. 
 
Normative Institutions  
 
Lack of ethical and professional guidelines  
 
Cisco chief security officer John N. Stewart observed that organizations tend to be slower in the 
introduction of data integrity policies compared to consumers’ adoption of new technology (The 
Straits Times, 2010). The same is true of professional associations. Professional and ethical 
guidelines regarding posts on social networking have not been well-developed. In the medical 
world, for instance, there arguably is a lack of clear guidelines as to what constitutes an unethical 
or unprofessional online conduct for physicians (Lagu, Kaufman and Asch, 2004; Thompson, 
Dawson and Ferdig, 2008).  
 
Illegal or questionable activities such as violation of patient confidentiality are taking place in the 
social networking sites without the violators’ intent. In a survey conducted among U.S. medical 
schools to assess professionalism in medical students’ online posts, 60% of the respondents 
reported incidents of their medical students posting online content that were unprofessional and 
13% violated patient confidentiality. The study also found that only few schools had policies to 
deal with such violations. Illegal or questionable activities (such as, violation of patient 
confidentiality) are taking place in the social networking sites without the violators’ knowledge 
or intent (Chretien, Ryan, Chretien and Kind, 2009).  
 
Many app developers have also failed to follow ethical guidelines and principles. The Hong 
Kong-based developer, Pencake had developed the popular "Create Your Quiz" app, which was 
Facebook's No. 3 most popular outside developer behind Zynga and Electronic Arts. In July 
2010, Facebook announced that it disabled Pencake’s apps because Pencake had allegedly 
violated the "main principles" of Facebook’s platform policies and codes of ethics. Facebook’s 
code of ethics requires that a user must not spam or infringe on members' privacy.  
 
We cannot really take the deletion of a single developer’s apps as "proof positive" that SM 
providers, such as Facebook, may be serious about ensuring security and privacy of users’ 
information. Cowan (2010) argues: “[w]hile Facebook doesn't sell users' information to 
advertisers, it remains unclear what happens to the personal data harvested by the dozens of 
games, quizzes, personality tests and other time wasters that clutter Facebook”.  
 
Prior researchers have suggested that less visible players (e.g., independent developers) are more 
likely to engage in unethical and even illegal practices compared to more visible players (e.g., 
Facebook). Why might this be the case? For one thing, less visible players are less likely to be 
spotlighted by the media. To examine why firms show a differential tendency to engage in and 
respond to potentially demeaning and reputationdamaging activities (e.g., violating SM users’ 
privacy and engaging in fraudulent activities) it would be helpful to consider the stigmatization 
process associated with such activities. A central concept here is arbiters. Note that arbiters’ 
views and/or actions have influence over social behavior.  
 
Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, and Hambrick (2008) argue that arbiters’ “constituent-minded 
sensemaking” influences the stigmatization process. They have identified three categories of 
“arbiters”—social, legal, and economic. Social arbiters include members of the press, 
governance watchdog groups, academics, and activists. Legal arbiters are those who enforce 
rules and regulations. Economic arbiters make decisions about engaging in economic exchange 
with individuals.  
 
News media reports serve as an intermediary affecting the perceptions of the market audience 
about a firm’s scandalous and “nonconforming” behaviors (Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 
2006). Media reports have also played a critical role in the criminalization of computer crimes 
(Hollinger and Lanza-Kaduce, 1988). Prior research indicates that the extent to which arbiters 
and other external actors criticize, devalue, or question a firm (following a reputation-damaging 
event) is a function of the firm’s external visibility and reputation (Rhee and Valdez, 2009). In 
the automobile industry, for instance, media are more likely to target and write negative 
comments on recalls by higher reputation automakers than on the lower reputation automakers 
(Haunschild and Rhee, 2004; Rhee and Haunschild, 2006). Consistent with theory, SM actors 
with a higher degree of external visibility seem to experience more scrutiny and direct more 
efforts toward preventing privacy and security breaches.  
 
In April 2010, four U.S. Senators argued that Facebook needed to enhance privacy measures 
(Liedtke, 2010). The Electronic Privacy Information Centre and 15 other groups filed a 
complaint about Facebook's instant personalization with the Federal Trade Commission in May 
2010 (Cowan, 2010). The Federal Trade Commission examined the privacy and data collection 
practices of social networking sites including Facebook (Liedtke, 2010). Likewise, in March 
2010, Jim Gamble, chief executive of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection (CEOP) 
criticized Facebook after investigators found that a convicted murderer met his teenage victim 
through a fake Facebook profile (Belfast Telegraph, 2010).  
 
Facebook and other SM sites responded by announcing some security measures. For instance, 
Bebo and Facebook introduced the safety application ClickCEOP. ClickCEOP buttons were 
developed to protect users under 18 from cyber-bullies and other abuses. That may be a small 
comfort for Facebook users’, parents. Likewise, Facebook Beacon, which allowed sharing users' 
activity on thirdparty sites (e.g., eBay and Fandango) with friends was modified following 
complaints from users and privacy advocacy groups (Fletcher and Ford, 2010).  
 
Cognitive Institutions  
 
The institutions associated with cognitive programs are built on mental maps of individual users 
and thus function primarily at the individual level (Huff, 1990). Many effects can serve as 
cognitive feedback depending on the nature and motivation of the actor. Put differently, 
cognitive systems influence the lens through which users view the risks involved in SM (Scott, 
2001). SM users’ skills, expertise, experience, knowledge, and technical know-how can be 
considered as components of interest for cognitive institutions.  
 
Precautionary measures  
 
Most SM users are found to perform poorly in risk assessment exercises involving their 
information online. The Australian Federal Police AFP's high tech crime group recently 
conducted a trial among a group of Facebook users and found that 98 % of them had put enough 
information on their personal pages to allow identities to be stolen (Neighbour, 2010). Similarly, 
Sophos’ study conducted in 2008 found that 40% of Internet users used the same password for 
all websites they accessed (Miller and Stone, 2009). According to Consumer Reports’ State of 
the Net survey released in May 2010, 3% of SM users admitted mentioning when they were 
away from home, 52% posted their full birth date, information 21% posted photos of children, 
13% posted children's names and 8% provided home street address (Woollacott, 2010). Note too 
that according to Britain's fraud prevention agency, Cifas a recent trend has been the rise in 
identity fraud which makes use of the victim's current address (Salmon, 2010).  
 
Experts argue that employers should avoid encouraging untrained and unmonitored employees to 
blog about their company's products and services. This is especially important if an employer is 
concerned about its goodwill or it recognizes that SM may have a potential to expose private 
company practices that can be perceived as unfair or deceptive (Lazar, 2010). Professional 
service organizations, comprising highly trained and licensed professionals such as physicians, 
radiologists and lawyers--known as “extreme” professional services, extensively rely on tacit 
knowledge and long training periods (Levy, Goelman, Yu and Paging, 2006; Levy and Yu, 2006; 
Singh and Wachter, 2008). These organizations are greatly concerned about security issues 
associated with SM . Boston Medical Center (BMC), a private hospital center affiliated with 
Boston University, offers a case in point. BMC blocks access to all SM websites using security 
software from Websense Inc. Users who attempt to access SM sites such as Facebook, YouTube 
or Twitter are shown a page indicating that their destination is off-limits. Brad Blake, director of 
IT at BMC noted that if BMC employees created a Facebook account and patients to be friends, 
"that would constitute a security breach". He went on saying that “[o]ur senior management has 
felt it easier just to block these sites rather than trying to police and manage them" (Tucci, 2010).  
 
A failure to understand the context of SM use is also likely to lead to an exposé of potentially 
unethical and even illegal behaviors and practices. For instance, in 2009, a Facebook profile led 
to a cancellation of a Canadian woman’s disability payments by her insurance company. The 
reason was that her profile on social networking sites claimed she was no longer depressed. The 
insurance company said it had seen photos of the woman on Facebook, enjoying herself on 
nights out and on a beach vacation (Cross, 2009).  
 
A final point is that younger SM users perform poorly on precautionary measures compared to 
older ones. For instance, a study found that 22% of all Internet users made five or more pieces of 
personal information (e.g., birth date, home address, cellphone number) available on their social 
networking pages. The proportion was 32% for people between the ages of 18 and 32 (Cowan, 
2010).  
 
Defensive measures  
 
An understanding of manipulative techniques used by various creatures to fool their enemies is 
of particular relevance for cybercrimes involving SM. In particular, a phenomenon proposed by 
Dawkins (1982) called the “rare enemy syndrome,” provides a helpful theoretical perspective for 
understanding how victims often fall to new unfamiliar baits or lures. The basic idea behind rare 
enemy syndrome is simple. The enemy’s manipulation is so rare that evolutionary development 
has not yet progressed to the point that the victim has an effective counter poison (de Jong, 
2001).  
 
From the potential victim’s standpoint, one important point to note about social networking is 
that most SM users are young. For instance, while 52% of the population in Singapore used SM 
in 2010, the proportions were 95% for the 15-19 age-group and 89% for the 20-29 age-group 
(Supreme Court of Singapore, 2010). In this regard, the teens’ and youth's cognitive skills and 
competencies, and, associated beliefs are considered as major influencing factors on their SM 
behaviors and outcome. According to a recent study, 42% of respondents in the 18 to 29 age 
groups were unable to answer any question about privacy law correctly (Cowan, 2010). Cyber-
criminals preying on them can be considered as the “rare enemy” since youths and teens haven’t 
yet developed counter poison to deal with them.  
 
A parallel can be drawn from the literature on physical crimes. Most cyber-criminals that prey 
upon SM users employ a similar modus operandi as in physical crimes which involve gaining 
access to and trust of the victim. The victimization process can viewed as a temporal sequence of 
activities through which the crime progresses. For instance, offenders against children (such as, 
pedophiles) usually use the power of persuasion and friendship to first gain the trust of the child, 
and in some cases parents, as well. Friendship is a critical step toward gaining cooperation 
(Elliott, Browne and Kilcoyne, 1995; Leclerc, Beauregard and Proulx, 2008; Murray, 2000). We 
would argue that fraudsters find it easy to gain trust and cooperation of SM users who have no 
past experience of distrust. One online romance scam victim, Sally Schrock reported that a 
scammer she met on a social networking site started sending her gifts (gaining trust) (kmbc.com, 
2006). The scammer then asked for her Social Security number and e-mail password (gaining 
cooperation).  
 
Additionally, part of the fascinating character of social networks stems from the fact that they are 
built on trust-based architectures. The real or perceived relationships of trust that connect social 
networking users increase scammers’ chance of gaining trust and cooperation from potential 
victims. For, for example, a fraudulent message sent from a SM user’s social network is often 
considered to be more trustworthy compared to random a spam message (Ramsey and 
Venkatesan, 2010). 
 
Discussion and Implications  
 
SM providers are pushing their users a bit too hard to share personal information. A convenient 
but possibly false assumption among some SM providers is that the Internet generation values 
openness and cares less about privacy (Cowan, 2010). In April 2010, Facebook came up with 
new rules, which required members to share more information (Lyons, 2010).  
 
One way to understand SM providers’ orientation towards security and privacy would be to 
examine them in the backdrop of current institutional arrangements and technological 
development. For SM providers (such as, Facebook) to maintain control over various actors (e.g., 
consumers, advertisers, regulators and privacy advocacy groups), a proper decoupling of 
responses is needed. Decision makers in social networking sites simultaneously utilize different 
combinations of actions in parallel that reflect their mixed reading of the environment (George, 
Chattopadhyay, Sitkin and Barden, 2006).Various institutional actors differ in terms of power 
they have to affect an organization’s (e.g., Facebook’s) outcome. Different theoretical 
contributions and various empirical studies have led to the accepted view that the exact nature of 
decoupling is a function of relative powers of competing organizational and institutional interests 
(March and Olsen, 1989; Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981a, b; Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 1998, 2001; 
Zajac and Westphal, 1995). These studies also provide support for the notion that substantial 
responses cannot be made to appease two sets of actors that diametrically oppose one another. 
More to the point, the substantive response relates to the threat or opportunity associated with the 
actor that is perceived to be more powerful and the symbolic response relates to the threat or 
opportunity associated with the actor perceived to possess less power (George, Chattopadhyay, 
Sitkin, and Barden, 2006).  
 
Facebook’s substantive response relates to the advertising opportunity. That is, advertisers are 
more powerful actors than consumers from the company’s standpoint. A Newsweek article 
asserted (Lyons, 2010): 
 
The truth is, Zuckerberg [Facebook founder and CEO] needs your data. His business is 
built on it. You are not Facebook's customer. You are its inventory--you are the product 
Facebook is selling. Facebook's real customers are advertisers. You're useful only 
because you can be packaged and sold. The more information Facebook extracts from 
you, the more you are worth. Consider that in 2005, Facebook's privacy policy was one 
sentence long and said that none of your info would be shared with anyone who wasn't in 
one of your groups. Today the policy is longer than the Constitution and requires a 
lawyer to parse its meaning. Why doesn't Facebook just use its original one-sentence 
policy? I'll take a wild guess and say advertisers, not members, were the driving force 
here. 
 
As to the involvement of the third party developer in the value chain, it is worth noting that an 
innovation’s success hinges on having well-developed systems and components that are 
interoperable and compatible with a company’s products and the creation of externalities. Such 
products help create a promising innovation ecosystems–“the collaborative arrangements 
through which firms combine their individual offerings into a coherent, customer-facing 
solution” (Adner, 2006).  
 
A final observation is that the widespread use of social networking platforms can be considered 
as a part of a more general trend toward cloud computing (Ramsey and Venkatesan, 2010). In 
this regard, various security risks and challenges associated with cloud computing deserve 
attention (Kshetri, 2010b, 2011).  
 
Managerial Implications  
 
Our account has implications for management practices. In light of the lack of welldeveloped 
institutional frameworks such as regulations, and ethical and professional standards, there is a 
strong need for organizations to develop policies, culture and techniques to manage and monitor 
SM uses within an organization. Organizations that have clear policy, procedures, limits, and 
instructions regarding the use of SM are less likely to become targets or victims of various forms 
of cybercrimes. For instance, as noted above, apps downloaded from less reputed websites are 
more likely to pose security risks. In this regard, organizations need to have a clear policy 
regarding apps download in devices owned by the organization. For instance, some online game 
apps may not only lead to a decline in employee performance but also to an increased security 
risk.  
 
In light of organizations' use of SM in diverse activities, it is also important to have clear policies 
and guidelines regarding posts on SM networks by employees. It may also be important to 
regularly monitor online posts on SM sites by employees, which may lead to a leak of 
organizational secrets. This is especially important for organization dealing with sensitive 
information such as hospitals and government departments.  
 
From organizations’ standpoint, criminal activities of various cybercrime firms are not the only 
risks associated with SM. Sometimes organizations are likely to become targets and victims of 
unfair and unjust criticisms that are raised by various stakeholders through social media 
campaigns. In such cases, organizations can use SM to defend themselves against unjust 
criticisms from these campaigners. That is, just like diamond is the only material hard enough to 
cut diamond effectively, SM can be an effective tool to fight against a social media campaign 
targeted against a company. A nice and striking example to illustrate this point would be Procter 
& Gamble’s (P&G) use of social media to address concerns of a group of consumers that were 
dissatisfied with its Dry Max technology, who initiated a Facebook campaign against the 
technology. In 2009, P&G introduced the technology into its Pampers product line, which also 
received awards from parenting magazines (Heussner, 2010). A customer reported that her child 
had developed a diaper rash, who created a Facebook page in an attempt force P&G to withdraw 
the product. By May 2010, 7,000 parents had joined the anti-Dry Max campaign, which created 
intense pressures on the firm to withdraw the product from the market (Barwise and Seán, 2010). 
P&G was, however, confident in Dry Max’s performance thanks to its long experience in such 
products. The company’s experience was that some proportions of babies always develop rashes. 
P&G’s well-established SM networks such as Pampers Village and Pampers Facebook page 
proved to be highly effective to fight against the antiDry Max campaign. Through these 
platforms, P&G made its case sympathetically, clearly and authoritatively. The company 
responded to all complaints, offered advices, and explained compelling reasons as to why the 
product would not be withdrawn. A September 2010 report of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
Commission indicated that the agency found no link between Dry Max and the occurrence of 
diaper rash.  
 
Concluding Comments  
 
Management of security risks is a critical practical challenge that organizations face in the digital 
economy. The above analysis indicates that the SM security and privacy challenges are 
significant. Social networking sites are a potential goldmine for cyber-criminals. It is clear from 
the privacy and security approaches of SM providers that they have lost sight of what had made 
them great. Most SM users, on the other hand, lack precautionary measures in their SM 
activities. There has also been a lack of defensive measures or counterpoison.  
 
Ensuring that both technological and behavioral/perceptual factors are given equal consideration 
in the design and implementation of a computer network is thus crucial. Technological measures 
range from simply disconnecting databases containing sensitive information from the Internet to 
the deployment of sophisticated anti-fraud technologies. Similarly, simple behavioral measures 
can stop some serious cybercrimes. A simple training strategy aimed at improving the ability of 
employees to use SM more securely is likely to reduce a significant proportion of cybercrimes.  
 
Finally, today, there is an emerging trend toward the use of contents posted on social media as 
evidence in civil and criminal proceedings (Supreme Court of Singapore, 2010). This trend is 
likely to affect the naïve (e.g. youths and teens) more than the general population. The above 
discussion also indicates that a failure to understand the context of SM use is also likely to lead 
to an exposé of wrongdoing. 
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Footnotes  
 
1. Here is how click fraud on Facebook works. A fraudster may use fake accounts logs in to 
Facebook and views the ads that are displayed. When a competitor’s ads are displayed, the 
fraudster clicks them. Note that, according to Facebook rules, up to six clicks on an ad by a user 
in a 24 hour period are charged to the advertiser (Techcrunch.com 2009). Fraudsters reportedly 
create thousands of fake Facebook accounts with a wide variety of demographic information. 
One advertiser reportedly paid $200 to an Indian operation for 2,000 Facebook accounts. The 
going rate was $10 per 100 accounts if unique email accounts are supplied. Once the accounts 
are created, they use software to fill out the varied demographic information, and that software 
also manages all these accounts (Techcrunch.com 2009).  
 
2. The concept of manifest and latent functions (Merton 1968) can be very helpful in 
understanding astroturfers’ behaviors. Manifest functions are explicitly stated and understood by 
the participants in the relevant action and the consequences can be observed or expected. Latent 
functions are those that are not explicitly stated or recognized by the people involved. In a SM 
campaign, for instance, the manifest posture is bloggers’ testimonials about certain brands, but 
below the surface deeply ingrained are various actions orchestrated by Astroturfers. 
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